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Notes
NLRB Determination of Incumbent Unions'
Majority Status
A National Labor Relations Board bargaining order' remedying an
employer's refusal to bargain with a purported representative of his
employees 2 forecloses the employees' freedom to choose or to refrain from
choosing a bargaining representative.3 The Supreme Court has therefore
limited Board use of bargaining orders, when a union seeks initial
recognition, to cases in which an employer's unfair labor practices
preclude proper determination of a bargaining representative's majority
status in a Board supervised election. 4 The Court has also held that absent such practices, an election is the only required method for resolving
majority status disputes in the initial recognition situation.5
While the Board has adopted this approach to determine the majority
status of a union seeking initial recognition, it has rejected it in cases of
an employer's refusal to bargain with an incumbent union, when that
refusal is based on the union's loss of majority support.6 Prior to 1969 the
Board treated employers' refusals to bargain with incumbent and
'Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) authorizes the NLRB "to
take such affirmative action ... as will effectuate the policies of this subchapter." 29
U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976). The bargaining order was devised early in Board history as a remedy
for unlawful refusals to bargain. See, e.g., Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944);
NLRB v. P. Lorilard Co., 314 U.S. 512 (1942).
2
Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse
to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions
of section 9(a)." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). Under section 9(a), however, only refusals to
bargain with "[riepresentatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees" violate the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976). An
employer is prohibited from recognizing a minority union by § 8(a)(2) of the Act. 29 U.S.C: §
158(a)(2) (1976), construedin International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 366
U.S. 731 (1961).
3Section 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976), guarantees employees the right to choose
or to refrain from choosing a bargaining representative. A bargaining order forecloses exercise of the latter choice, and is thus particularly onerous where the employees have rejected the union in an election. See Note, NLRB v. Gissel PackingCo.: BargainingOrders
andEmployee Free Choice, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 318, 320-21 & n.12 (1970).
4
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). See Christensen & Christensen, Gissel
Packingand "Good Faith Doubt": The Gestalt of Required Recognition of Unions under
the NLRA, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 411 (1970).
5
Linden Lumber Div., Summers & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974).
6Wanda Petroleum, 217 N.L.R.B. 376, 376 n.3 (1975); Nu-Southern Dyeing & Finishing,
Inc., 179 N.L.R.B. 573, 573 n.1 (1969), enforced in par4 444 F.2d 11 (4th Cir. 1971).
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recognition-seeking unions similarly, and issued a bargaining order on an
employer's failure to establish a "good faith doubt" of union majority
status in unfair labor practice proceedings. 7 The Board's change in policy
in the initial recognition situation was based on the greater reliability
and speed of employee elections.8 While these considerations are also important in the incumbency situation, the Board has been reluctant to articulate significant differences between the two situations to justify its
retention of a test of an employer's good faith doubt in the incumbency
situation alone. The resulting confusion has led to conflict, excessive
litigation and violation of the fundamental policies of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA). This note will examine the policy bases and
distinctions on which disparate treatment of the two situations is
grounded and will advise rejection of a doubt-based test when an
employer refuses to bargain with an incumbent union, in favor of a test
which seeks the best available objective indicia of actual majority support.
THE INITIAL RECOGNITION STANDARDS

The Good FaithDoubt Test and Its Repudiation
In Joy Silk Mills, Inc.,9 an employer refused to bargain after union
authorization cards were signed by a majority of his employees. The
Board found that the employer's unlawful anti-union activity following
the refusal evidenced a bad faith desire to gain time in which to dissipate
the union's claimed majority, and issued a bargaining order.10 This focus
on the employer's state of mind led to creation of two categories of section 8(a)(5) violations: first, as in Joy Silk, cases in which independent unfair labor practices" subsequent to the refusal served as a badge of bad
7Initial recognition situation: NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969); Joy Silk
Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951); Aaron
Bros., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966); Note, NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.: BargainingOrders
and Employee Free Choice, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 318, 321-32 (1970). Incumbency situation:
Bartenders, Hotel, Motel, and Restaurant Employers Bargaining Ass'n, 213 N.L.R.B. 651
(1974); Nu-Southern Dyeing and Finishing, Inc., 179 N.L.R.B. 573, 573 n.1 (1969), enforced
in par 444 F.2d 11 (4th Cir. 1971); Terrell Machine Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 1480, 1480-81 (1969),
enforced, 427 F.2d 1088 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970); Celanese Corp. of
America, 95 N.L.R.B. 664 (1951); see Morales, Presumption of Union'sMajority Status in
NLRB Cases, 29 LAB. L.J. 309 (1978); Seger, The Majority Status of Incumbent Bargaining
Representatives, 47 TUL. L. REV. 961, 978-89 (1973).
sLinden Lumber Div., Summers & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 304-07 (1974). See notes
24-30 & accompanying text infra.
'85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949), enforced as modified Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d
732 (D.C. Cir 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951).
lId. at 1264-65.
""Independent unfair labor practices" will be used in this note to describe employer
violations of § 8(a)(1) - (4) of the NLRA. Such independent unfair labor practices may be
seen as colorative of the refusal to bargain, as in the Joy Silk test, or evaluated as to the extent to which they impair NLRB elections, as in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575
(1969).
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faith; second, cases in which the employer's lack of a reasonable
explana12
tion for his refusal to bargain itself implied bad faith.
Amid widespread criticism

13

of the Joy Silk doctrine, the Board

eliminated the latter category of violation 14 and limited the finding of bad
faith to instances in which independent unfair labor practices were "of
such a character as to reflect a purpose to evade an obligation to
bargain."' ' This limitation failed to quell the rising tide of dissatisfaction
with the Joy Silk employer state-of-mind test; 6 some twenty years after
the formulation of the Joy Silk good faith doubt test, the Supreme Court
barred further inquiry into the employer's state of mind in NLRB v.
Gissel Packing Co.' 7 The Gissel opinion expressly jettisoned the good

faith doubt test, and premised issuance of a bargaining order on the
presence of independent unfair labor practices sufficiently severe to
destroy the "laboratory conditions" necessary for a fair election. 8 The
Court emphasized the shift in focus from the employer's state of mind to
the effect of the unfair labor practices on the employee's free choice, by
creating a hierarchy of unfair labor practices by which the appropriateness of a bargaining order might be measured. 19
The shift from a search for employer doubt culminated in Linden
Lumber Division, Summers & Co. v. NLRB.2 In Linden, the Supreme
Court held that unless an employer has engaged in unfair labor practices
sufficient to violate the Gissel standards, an election is the sole ap1"See, e.g., Fred Snow, 134 N.L.R.B. 709 (1961), enforced, Snow v. NLRB, 308 F.2d 687
(9th Cir. 1962).
"Note, Refusal-to-Recognize Charges Under Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA: Card Checks
and Employee Free Choice, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 387, 397-401 (1966); Lewis, The Use and
Abuse of Authorization Cards in Determining Union Majority, 16 LAB. L.J. 434 (1965),
cited in Affeldt, Bargaining Orders Without an Election: The NationalLabor Relations
Board's "FinalSolution," 57 KY. L.J. 151, 154 (1969).
"Aaron Bros., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966); John P. Serpa, Inc., 155 N.L.R.B. 99 (1965).
"Aaron Bros., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077, 1079 (1966).
"Affeldt, supra note 13; Browne, The LaborBoard Unsettles the Scales, 42 NOTRE DAME
LAw. 133, 145-46 (1966); see NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 594 (1969).
17395 U.S. 575 (1969).
18id. at 612.
"Id. at 613-16. The problems of the initial recognition situation were not completely
resolved by adoption of the Gissel standards. Three major areas of controversy remain: (1)
it is unclear how the Board places a given case within a given Gissel category, Christensen
& Christensen, Gissel Packingand "Good Faith Doubt" The Gestalt of Required Recognition of Unions under the NLRA, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 411, 445-47 (1970); see, e.g., General
Stencils, 178 N.L.R.B. 108 (1969), enforced in part, 438 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1971); (2) it is
unclear when, if appropriate, a bargaining order should become effective; and (3) whether
it should apply retroactively or prospectively in a given case. Trading Port, Inc., 219
N.L.R.B. 298 (1975); Walther, NLRB Bargaining Orders: A Problem Solving or Ivory
Tower Approach to LaborLaw, 17 WASHBURN L.J. 1,12-19 (1977). Nonetheless, the current
approach, by focusing on the impact of an employer's unfair labor practices on his
employees' right to choose a bargaining representative rather than the employer's mental
state, is more consistent with the underlying policy of preserving employees' free choice.
Note, NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.: Bargaining Orders and Employee Free Choice, 45

N.Y.U.L. REV. 318, 336 (1970).
20419 U.S. 301 (1974).
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propriate method for determination of majority status in the initial
recognition situation."'
Reasons for the Shift
This retreat from determination of majority status in unfair labor practice proceedings and substitution of the election process has been based
on a number of policy factors: First, a perceived difficulty in inferring an
employer's state of mind has led to reliance on more objective
indicators. 2 Further, there has been increasing realization that an
employer's state of mind is irrelevant to the actual majority status of the
bargaining representative.23 Second, the relative speed of the election
process leads to earlier resolution of disruptive disputes. 2'4 Third, the
greater reliability of the election process reduces the chance of fastening
an unwanted union on employees and employers. 2 Fourth, it gives the
NLRB staff a faster, simpler set of procedures for determining majority
status. 6 Fifth, it removes the parties from the adversary roles of the unfair labor practice litigation, where prolonged confrontation can lead to
7
continued disharmony after Board disposition of the dispute.
By focusing the attention of the decisionmaker on the actual majority
status of the bargaining representative, emphasizing speed and accuracy,
and promoting greater certainty as to standards and procedures, the current approach promotes industrial peace by encouraging party selfregulation and informal resolution of disputes. In contrast, Board procedures and policies in the incumbency situation fail to resolve the central issue of actual majority status, and almost seem designed to
engender uncertainty and dispute.

1
2'I

at 310.

"Id. at 307; cf Seger, supra note 7, at 984 (analysis of good faith doubt test in the incumbency situation); Christensen, Motive and Intent in the Commission of Unfair Labor
Practices:The Supreme Court and the Fictive Formality,77 YALE L.J. 1269 (1968) (motive

and intent in determination of violations of § 8(a)(3) and § 8(a)(2) of the NLRA).
"Seger, supra note 7, at 984-89.
'Linden Lumber Div., Summers & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 306-07 (1974).
5
See NLRB v. Gissell Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 596, 602 & n.19 (1969); Brooks v.
NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 100 (1954); NLRB v. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562, 564-66 (4th Cir.
1967); Browne, The Labor Board Unsettles the Scales, 42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 133, 146 &
n.104 (1966). While the dissent in Linden, supra note 5, points out the statutory provision
for recognition of unions designated by means other than an election, the Linden majority
found such informal evidence of majority insufficiently compelling to force an employer's
recognition. While the effect of the new rule is to make it more difficult for unions to
organize nonunion establishments, see A. Cox. LAW AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY
41-42 (1960); Note, Refusal to Recognize Charges Under Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA: Card

Checks and Employee Free Choice, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 387, 405 (1966), this is justified by
the greater reliability of the election process, and its increased protection of employees'
free choice.
26
See 'A. Cox. supra note 25, at 41.
"See Wolkinson, The Remedial Efficacy of NLRB Remedies in Joy Silk Cases, 55 COR1, 24 (1969).

NELL L. REV.
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INCUMBENT UNIONS' MAJORITY
THE INCUMBENCY STANDARDS

Under current Board rules an incumbent union is irrebuttably presumed to have majority support for one year after commencement of a
collective bargaining relationship. 28 Any refusal by the employer to
bargain during this year violates section 8(a)(5), and can precipitate a
bargaining order. 29 On expiration of the protective year, the presumption
can be rebutted by an employer's demonstration in unfair labor practice
proceedings either that the union no longer has a majority, or that the
employer's0 refusal is based upon reasonable, serious doubt of the union's
majority.
The Reasonable Doubt Test
31
A two-pronged test, first formulated in Celanese Corp. of America
determines whether the employer's doubt is "reasonable": the issue must
be raised in the absence of independent unfair labor practices, and there
must be sufficient objective 32 considerations to provide reasonable
grounds for the doubt.2 3 An employer who satisfies both prongs of the
test is determined not to have violated section 8(a)(5) and has no further
obligation to bargain2 4 Thus the incumbency test, which focuses on the
employer's state of mind, is no more than the old Joy Silk initial recognition test.3 5 The problems of focus, reliability and procedural efficiency
which led to its rejection in the initial recognition situation remain
troublesome in the incumbency situation.
The major and most fundamental problem of the current Board approach to incumbency questions is its focus on the essentially collateral
issue of an employer's doubt.36 The current Board test may relieve an

21Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954).
2There are three extraordinary exceptions to this rule: (1) where the certified union has
dissolved or become defunct; (2) where as the result of a schism the entire membership of

the union has transferred its affiliation to another union; (3) where the size of the bargaining unit has fluctuated radically within a short time. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96,
98-99 (1954).
3Bartenders, Hotel, Motel and Restaurant Employers Bargaining Ass'n, 213 N.L.R.B.
651, 651, 653 (1974); see Morales, supra note 7, at 310.
3195 N.L.R.B. 664 (1951).

"Considerations similar to those leading to the abandonment of the subjective element
in the initial recognition doctrine have resulted in an "objectification" of the formerly subjective Celanese test. Laystrom Mfg. Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1482, 1484 (1965), enforcement
denied, 359 F.2d 799 (7th Cir. 1966); see NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293,
299-300 (9th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 99 S. Ct. 2847 (1979).
"Terrell Machine Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 1480, 1480-81 (1969), enforced, 427 F.2d 1088 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970), quoted in Pioneer Inn Assoc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1263 at
1265 (1977); see Morales, supranote 7, at 310.
31NLRB v. Dayton Motels, Inc., 474 F.2d 328 (6th Cir. 1973); NLRB v. Ben Duthler, Inc.,
395 F.2d 28 (6th Cir. 1968); Faye Nursing Home, Inc., 215 N.L.R.B. 658 (1974)(dictum);
United Supermarkets, Inc, 214 N.L.R.B. 958, 960 (1974)(Miller, Chairman, dissenting opinion).
31See notes 9-12 & accompanying text supra.
MNLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 594 (1969); see Seger, supra note 7, at 984.
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employer of the duty to bargain, even upon demonstration of the union's
actual majority.3 7 Such a result directly conflicts with the stated policy of
the NLRA, which requires that an employer bargain with an employee
representative designated by an aptual majority 8 This misguided inquiry into employers' doubt has led to procedural confusion and instability in two areas: first, the quantum of evidence sufficient 4to
provide
0
reasonable grounds, 39 and second, the effect of such evidence.
Sufficiency of Evidence of Employer Doubt
The amount of evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable doubt and
thus overcome the presumption of majority is one source of uncertainty
under the current Board approach. The objective criteria are often ambiguous.4 1 Furthermore, assessing the evidence in light of the circumstances of each case41 leads to conflicting results in factually similar
situations,' 3 and makes it difficult to determine which evidence is
dispositive of a given case.
The courts of appeals are in conflict on the question of sufficiency. A
number of circuits require "clear, cogent and convincing evidence ' 44 to
establish an employer's reasonable doubt. This standard in effect means
an employer cannot establish loss of majority through evidence of conduct sufficient to raise an inference of majority loss, but must
demonstrate actual loss of majority (which is generally beyond his
power 45), or express repudiation by the employees. 46 The remainder of the
3
""[E]ven if in fact the Union actually represented a majority of the employees in the
bargaining unit, the Company would still have a complete defense if it had a good faith
doubt about such representation. NLRB v. Ben Duthler, Inc., 395 F.2d 28 (6th Cir. 1968)."
NLRB v. Dayton Motels, Inc., 474 F.2d 328, 332 (6th Cir. 1973); see Faye Nursing Home,
Inc., 215 N.L.R.B. 658 (1974).
3'29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 159(a) (1976).
39
NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 297 (9th Cir. 1978); see Morales, supra note
7, at 310-12.
' 0See Bartenders, Hotel, Motel and Restaurant Employers Bargaining Ass'n, 213
N.L.R.B. 651, 656 (1974) (Kennedy, Member, dissenting opinion).
"Compare, e.g., Peoples Gas System, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. No. 143, 99 L.R.R.M. 1423
(Sept. 29, 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-2330 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 28, 1978) (forty percent
decline in dues checkoffs insufficient to support reasonably based doubt) with Lodges 1746
& 743, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 809, 812 (D.C.
Cir.), cert denied, 396 U.S. 1058 (1969) (sharp reduction in checkoff basis for good faith
doubt) and Wooster Brass Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 1633 (1948) (same); NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget,
Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 307 (9th Cir. 1978) (union inactivity and failure to process grievances insufficient evidence) with NLRB v. Nu-southern Dyeing & Finishing, Inc., 444 F.2d 11 (4th
Cir. 1971) (union inactivity among factors justifying good faith doubt) and IngressPlastene,
Inc. v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 542, 547 (7th Cir. 1970) (same).
' 2See, e.g., Celanese Corp. of America, 95 N.L.R.B. 644, 672 (1951).
3
1See note 41 supra.
"NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 297 (9th Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Retired Persons Pharmacy, 519 F.2d 486, 489-90 (2d Cir. 1975); Orion Corp. v. NLRB, 515 F.2d 81, 85
(7th Cir. 1975); Ref-Chem v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 127, 130 (5th Cir. 1969); Petitioner's Brief for
Certiorari
at 14-16, Vegas Vic, Inc. v. NLRB, 434 U.S. 818 (1978).
45
See notes 49-51 & accompanying text infra.
16See Montgomery Ward & Co., 210 N.L.R.B. 717 (1974).
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circuits have retained
the less stringent, but vague, Board standard of
"reasonable basis. ' 4 7
The Effect of Productionof Sufficient Evidence
Under the current Board approach an employer's production of
evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable doubt is a complete defense
to the unfair labor practice charge, and the employer has no further
obligation to bargain. 8 In Stoner Rubber Co. 49 the Board seemed to
modify the Celanese test, and held that inasmuch as actual proof of majority is so peculiarly within the special competence of the union, production by the employer of evidence sufficient to cast "serious doubt" on
the union's majority status would cause the presumption of majority to
lose its force. The burden of proving actual majority on the date of the
refusal to bargain would then shift to the General Counsel, representing
the union. 0 Although the Stoner test has been adopted by several cir52
cuits, 51 the Board has repeatedly rejected further adherence to it.
The uncertainty generated by these conflicting procedures and standards of review is conducive neither to stable industrial relations nor to
protection of employees' free choice of a bargaining representative. The
Board's complicated and shifting standards also lead to problems in ap4
plication by administrative law judges 3 and to prolonged litigation.
IINLRB v. King Radio Corp., 510 F.2d 1154, 1156 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 839
(1975); Automated Business Systems v. NLRB, 497 F.2d 262, 270 (6th Cir. 1974); Retail,
Wholesale and Dep't Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Terrell
Machine Co. v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 1088, 1090 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970);
NLRB v. Frick Co., 423 F.2d 1327, 1331 (3d Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Little Rock Downtowner,
Inc., 414 F.2d 1084, 1091 (8th Cir. 1969); Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 14-15, Vegas
Vic, Inc. v. NLRB, 434 U.S. 818 (1978).
"See note 37 supra.
49123 N.L.R.B. 1440 (1959).
1Id. at 1445.
"Automated Business Systems v. NLRB, 497 F.2d 262 (6th Cir. 1974); Orion Corp. v.
NLRB, 515 F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1975); AIW, Local 289 v. NLRB, 476 F.2d 868 (D.C.Cir. 1973);
NLRB v. Frick Co., 423 F.2d 1327 (3d Cir. 1970); Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 11-18,
King Radio Corp. v. NLRB, 423 U.S. 839 (1975) (employer's reasonable doubt shifts
burden of proving majority to General Counsel). But see NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584
F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Retired Persons Pharmacy, 519 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1975);
NLRB v. Leatherwood Drilling Co., 513 F.2d 270 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 1016
(1975); NLRB v. King Radio Corp., 510 F.2d 1154 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 839
(1975) Terrell Machine Co. v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 1088 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 398 U.S. 929
(1970); NLRB v. Little Rock Downtowner, Inc., 414 F.2d 1084 (8th Cir. 1969) (reasonable
doubt a complete defense).
5E.g., United Supermarkets, Inc., 214 N.L.R.B. 958, 959 & n.10 (1974); Bartenders,
Hotel, Motel and Restaurant Employers Bargaining Ass'n, 213 N.L.R.B. 651, 654 n.21
(1974). But see Taft Broadcasting, 201 N.L.R.B. 801 (1973).
"See, e.g., Peoples Gas System, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. No. 143 slip op. at 4 n.6, 99 L.R.R.M.
1423, 1424 n.6 (Sept. 29, 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-2330 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 28, 1978);
Wanda Petroleum, 217 N.L.R.B. 376 (1975); Faye Nursing Home, 215 N.L.R.B. 658 n.1
(1974).
"See, e.g., Peoples Gas System, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. No. 143, 99 L.R.R.M. 1423 (Sept. 29,
1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-2330 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 28, 1978). Five years after the
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THE PRESUMPTION OF MAJORITY AND ITS RATIONALE

Bases of the Presumption of Majority
The presumption of continuing majority is an important factor in the
Board's disparate treatment of the incumbency and initial recognition
situations. Presumptions are created for a variety of reasons, three of
which are relevant here: probability, fairness, and social and economic
55
policy.
The early justifications for the presumption of continuing majority
were based on probability: prior existence of majority status is some indication of its probable continuance at a later date.5 6 Proponents of the
Stoner test, which allocates to the employer only the burden of going forward to meet the presumption, contend that probability is the sole basis
of the presumption. 7 This factor alone, however, does not distinguish the
incumbency from the initial recognition situation, in which courts have
been extremely reluctant to issue bargaining orders without such informal demonstration of prior majority support as a strike or signed
58
authorization cards.
The second basis for presumptions, fairness, places upon the party controlling the evidence the burden of proving its position. 9 As the Board
has conceded, 6 and commentators 61 and courts 62 agree, such proof of majority is more accessible to the union. Therefore, this consideration is not
a valid basis for the presumption of continuing majority either.
The third basis for the creation of a presumption is the implementation
of social and economic policies 6 3 and it is upon this basis that the validity
of the Board's presumption must ultimately rest. Chief among the
64
policies is the preservation of stable, existing bargaining relationships:

employer's refusal to bargain, the majority status of the union remains to be resolved,
despite an unchallenged election in which employees voted to oust the union.
5'C. MCCORMICK. EVIDENCE 806-07 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972); see Cleary, Presuming and
Pleading:An Essay on JuristicImmaturity, 12 STAN. L. REV. 5, 11-13, quoted in J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER. EVIDENCE § 300[03], at 13-14 (1978).
6
E.g., NLRB v. Whittier Mills Co., 111 F.2d 474, 478 (1940).
57
Bartenders, Hotel, Motel and Restaurant Employers Bargaining Ass'n, 213 N.L.R.B.
651, 656 & n.26 (1974)(Kennedy, Member, dissenting).
"8See Automated Business Systems v. NLRB, 497 F.2d 262, 267 n.1 (6th Cir. 1974).
6"C. MCCORMICK. supra note 55, at 806-07.
1Stoner Rubber Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1440, 1445 (1959). But see Bartenders, Hotel, Motel
and Restaurant Employers Bargaining Ass'n, 213 N.L.R.B. 651, 653-54 (1974).
61
R. GORMAN. BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 110, 113-14 (1976); Seger, supra note 7, at
982-83; 988.
"2See note 51 supra.
63
See Cleary, supra note 55.
6
NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 303-04 (9th Cir. 1978); Retired Persons
Pharmacy v. NLRB, 519 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Frick Co., 423 F.2d 1327,
1330-31 n.6 (3d Cir. 1970)(citing with approval Aaron Bros. Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077, 1079
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having already established its majority once, the union should not have
to do so again.6 5 But the Board has not analyzed its assumption" that inwill result; it merely resorts to ritualistic incantation of
dustrial stability
67
the phrase.

The quest for industrial stability was important in the passage of the
NLRA 6 1 which established certain preferred mechanisms to effectuate
that goal: the protection of free choice of bargaining representatives and
the encouragement of free collective bargaining.6 9 Were it not for the
countervailing effect of these factors, the Board could achieve industrial
stability through ex parte creation of bargaining relationshi-, ' -adiposition of bargaining agreements or contract terms, 'as it saw fit ° The
balance of free choice and stability in the incumbency sitiiation is a dif ficult one, but the Board has never gone beyond recognition of the dilemma and decided to what extent' industrial stability can override employee
free choice. 71 The few courts of appeals which have addressed this issue
hav reached conflicting results. 72 The' mere assertion that industrial
stability is fostered by a bargaining order, without an evaluation' of
countervailing considerations of employee free choice, will not_ suffice as a
basis for the presumption. Moreover, the effect of the presumption on-'the
preservation of-industrial peace must be evaluated
Conceledly, the presumption is likely to preserve the status 'quo;
however, the inference that preservation'of the status quo is conducive to
the industrial staOility enivisioned by the NLRA is far from compelling.
Typically the union has been inactive for months or years -prior,tor
an
employer's refusa to bargain. 3 While this type of bargaining, relati5r
'

n.8 (196.6)(dictum)); Pioneer Inn Assoc., 228 N.D.R.B. 1263, 1265,(1977);,Bartenders,)Hotel,
Motel and Restaurant Employers Bargaining Ass'n, 213 N.L.R.B. 651, 651 (1974); Terrell
Machine Co,, 173 N.L.R.B. 1480, 1480-81, enforced, 427 F.2d 1088 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 929 (1970); Comment, Daisy's,Originals,Inc. v. NLRB: New Restrictionson the
Use of BargainingOrders underthe NationalLaborRelations Ac, 122 U. PA. L. REV, 207,
21546 (1973); Seger, supra note 7, passim; Comment, Employee Repudiation.of Bargaining Representatives: An Appraisal of Existing Restrictions,,66. YALE, L.J.. 223, 224
65

NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F._2d 293, 300"(9th Cir. 1978).,'
.,
*'*
"E.g., cases cited note 64 supra. , -'
.: / .
-'
"See Comment,.Employee Repudiation of BargainingRepresentatives:An Apipraisal of
ExistingRestrictions, 66 YALE L.J. 223, 224 (1956).
,,
-

OCh.372,49 Stat. 449 (1935,current version at29 U.S.C. §§ a51-i69 (1976)). 'See Aj'Cox:

supra note 25, at 9.

-"

.

"29 U.S.C; § 159 (1976).
"°Such a result is clearly not within the scope of the NLRA. Seegenertilly Cox,The Duty
to Bargainin Good Faith, 71 HARVP
L. REWv1401 (1958).
7See cases cited note 64 supra.

"

.

72

,

,'

.

Compare Automated Business Systems v. NLRB, 497 F.2d 267 & n.1' (6th' Cir.,1974)
and Daisy's Originals, Inc. v. NLRB, 468-F.2d 493, 501-03 (5th Cir. 1972)with cases cited
note 64 supra.

.

'

.

'

.

'

"

'

,,?'See, e.g., NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 307 (9th Cir. 1978) (union pro
cessed no, grievances in years'preceding refusal, no employees attended'union meeting
when called; union agents inspected thd premises infrequently); Peoples Gas, System
Inc.,214 N.L.R.B. 944, 946, fev'd sub,fom: Teamsters LocalUnion 769 v. NLRB, 532 F.2d

INDIANA LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 54:651

ship may create the appearance of industrial stability inasmuch as it is
unlikely to give rise to strikes or other economic warfare, the intent of the
statute is to protect only that industrial stability resulting from actual
collective bargaining with the employees' chosen representative.14 Thus,
to the extent the Board's presumption preserves bargaining relationships other than those envisioned by the statute, it cannot legitimately
be based upon preservation of the status quo.
There is some evidence that the Board is also relying on a fourth rationale: punishment of employers who would base refusals to bargain on
spurious grounds out of anti-union motives. 75 Because the rationale of the
NLRA is remedial, punishment of "bad" employers is not within77 the
76
policy scope of the Act, and thus beyond the power of the Board.
The Effect of the Presumptionof Majority
Because the bases of the Board's presumption are weak, only a
minimum of evidence should be required to rebut it. That the presumption instead effectively places the burden of disproving majority
status on the employer,7 by allowing the General Counsel to rely solely
on the presumption to establish majority, 79 suggests that present Board
rules are not only unfair, but in violation of the spirit of Federal Rule of
Evidence 301.80 Rule 301 states that a presumption imposes on the party
1385, 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (union agreed to submit to any contract acceptable to management); Ingress-Plastene, Inc. v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 542, 547 (7th Cir. 1970)(union failed to
process grievances, recommend employees for promotion or super-seniority, or perform
safety inspections); Dixie Gas Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1257, 1258 (1965)(no communications
from union for over two years).
74 It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce ... by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting
the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing ....
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976); see notes 72-73 & accompanying text supra.
7"Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944); A. W. Thompson, Inc., 449 F.2d
1333,1337 (5th Cir. 1971); General Electric Co. Battery Prod., Cap. Dep't v. NLRB, 400
F.2d 713,730 (5th Cir. 1968); C & C Plywood Corp., 163 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1967); see Daisy's
Originals, Inc. v. NLRB, 468 F.2d 493, 502 (5th Cir. 1972).
"6Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940).
729 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976)(authorizes only "such affirmative action... as will effectuate
); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533
the policies of this subchapter ....
(1943); see Daisy's Originals, Inc. v. NLRB, 468 F.2d 493 (1972); cf. H.K. Porter Co. v.
NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1969).
78See Peoples Gas System, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. No. 143 slip op. at 9, 99 L.R.R.M. 1423 at
1426 (Sept. 29, 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-2330 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 28, 1978).
"See NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 297-98 (9th Cir. 1978).
""A presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going
forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption but does not shift to such party
the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of non-persuasion .... " FED. R. EVID. 301. 29
U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976) requires that NLRB proceedings shall, so far as practicable, be conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence applicable in the district courts of the
United States. The Board is permitted discretion in applying such rules, Teamsters Local
Union 769 v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 1385, 1392 (D.C. Cir. 1976), and courts have read this section
liberally, see, e.g., NLRB v. Capitol Fish Co., 294 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1961). However, the
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against whom it is directed only the burden of going forward with
evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, which thereupon vanishes."'
This so-called "bursting bubble" presumption is based on the congressional view that permanently altering the burden of persuasion, as does
the current Board test, gives too great a force to presumptions.82 Thus
the Board's current approach overemphasizes the probative effect of
prior majority status.
APPLICABILITY OF THE INITIAL RECOGNITION STANDARDS
TO THE INCUMBENCY SITUATION

Policy Similarities
Analysis of the Board's approach in light of the policies leading to the
actual majority test adopted in Linden Lumber83 for the initial recognition situation, indicates the Board's fundamental failure to focus on
resolving the issue of majority status by the speediest and most reliable
means available. 4 In light of the ambiguous nature of the circumstances
surrounding a union's loss of majority, an election is clearly a more
reliable indicator of employee support than is a presumption.8 5 There is
even greater impetus for speedy resolution of such disputes in the incumbency situation than in the initial recognition context. Disputes over
representation in section 8(a)(5) hearings and appeals can put the parties
in an adversary position for years.8 An election can resolve the issue in
well under one year, generally within six months.8 7 Furthermore, the current incumbency test has spawned division within the Board and among
the circuits as to both procedural and substantive standards of
majority. 88 Not only are these policy factors applicable to both situations,
there are other underlying similarities the Board has ignored in its different approaches to the incumbency and initial recognition situations.
words "so far as practicable" have been construed not to allow easy escape from the congressional purpose in requiring such compliance, which is to insure greater possibility of
judicial review, General Engineering, Inc. v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 367 (9th Cir. 1965), and the
TeamstersLocal Union court emphasized that the Board must at least address the evidentiary issues when it violates evidentiary rules. See Sears, Roebuck & Co., 224 N.L.R.B. 558,
559 (1976)(relying on the rationale of FED. R. EVID. in dealing with a state dead man's
statute).
Particularly when the congressional intent of a rule is made clear by ample legislative
history, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973), the Board should be bound
thereby or give compelling explanations for its noncompliance. But see NLRB v. Tahoe
Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 297 (9th Cir. 1978).
$'FED. R. EVID. 301.
"1H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973).
"See notes 23-27 & accompanying text supra.
"See Seger, supra note 7, at 985-87; notes 37-40 & accompanying text supra.
85See note 25 supra.
"E.g., Peoples Gas System, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. No. 143, 99 L.R.R.M. 1423 (Sept. 29,
1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-2330 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 28, 1978)(awaiting second appearance
before court of appeals, five years after refusal to bargain).
7
See Linden Lumber Div., Summers & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 306-07 (1974).
"8See notes 39-54 & accompanying text supra.
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The underlying statutory policies the Board must weigh are the same:
protection of employees' right to choose a bargaining representative, encouragement of the collective bargaining process, and preservation of industrial stability. 9 Making a union less vulnerable to repudiation after it
has had a chance to demonstrate its efficacy and consolidate its membership produces an anomaly: unions are given minimal protection at the inception of the bargaining relationship, when they are most vulnerable,
and maximum freedom from rejection after employees have had the opportunity to evaluate the union's performance.
FactualSimilarities
Not only are the policies governing resolution of such majority
disputes identical, factual similarities of the situations also militate for
uniform treatment. Both involve a union majority at some prior point,
demonstrated informally or by Board election; a union's demand for
bargaining; and an employer's refusal to do so2. Furthermore, the
underlying question of the actual majority of the union claiming
representative status is the same in both situations.9 1 These similarities
suggest that an approach more closely parallel to the initial recognition
tests would be more appropriate to determine actual majority support
than the present incumbency situation tests.
NEW APPROACHES TO THE REFUSAL TO BARGAIN
WITH AN INCUMBENT UNION

An election is the most reliable and fastest method of determining the
majority status of an incumbent union following an employer's refusal to
bargain.92 However since fears exist that anti-union employers would
abuse the unrestricted right to elections, 93 an employer must currently
9 4
satisfy the "reasonable doubt" test before he may obtain an election.
While this test is inappropriate and difficult to administer, an employer's
ability to destroy union support by independent unfair labor practices
(such as discriminatory discharge of union adherents), justifies setting
some threshold criteria for obtaining an election.
Limiting availability of elections by the Gissel test,99 which would
89

See Note, NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.: BargainingOrders and Employee Free Choice,
45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 318 (1970); Daisy's Originals, Inc. v. NLRB, 468 F.2d 493, 501 (5th Cir.
1972).
9
See Automated Business Systems v. NLRB, 497 F.2d 263, 267 n.1 (1974).
9
See notes 23, 37-40 & accompanying text supra.
92
See note 25 supra.
9
U.S. Gypsum, 157 N.L.R.B. 652 (1966); see S. REP. No. 105 PT. 2, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
10-11 (1947), reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 473-74 (1948).
9
U.S. Gypsum, 157 N.L.R.B. 652, 656 (1966).
"5NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 613-15 (1969) (now applied only in initial
recognition situation).
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order bargaining only when independent employer unfair labor practices
have precluded a fair election, would obviate this danger. An employer
who refrains from independent unfair labor practices could thus refuse to
bargain, requiring the union to test its majority in an election.9 6 This
standard might initially appear to give a union little protection from the
expense of repetitious elections; however, the expense of an election is
likely to be as great to an employer as it is to a union, possibly greater
considering the amount of time away from the job such campaigns often
involve. Because the vast majority of NLRB elections take place in small
shops9 7 where the economic power of the employer is not great, many
such employers will be unwilling to face the expense of repeated elections
unless their anti-union motivation is very strong, in which case present
NLRB remedies are also likely to be ineffective.9 8 Furthermore, by applying bargaining orders to remedy independent unfair labor practices
sufficient to impair election results, the Board would eliminate
employers' incentive to request elections in the hope of using the election
campaign to undermine the unions' majority through illegal activity. 99
Equally questionable is the assumption that frequent 09 elections
would produce industrial instability. Principles of industrial democracy
are central to the national labor policy,' 0' and a political model of
representation has long been accepted by the Board and courts. 02 Implicit in that model is periodic rejection or reaffirmation of the representative. Instability does not result from the orderly invocation of this pro10 3
cess, but rather from its abrogation.
96See
Seger, supra note 7, at 999 n.167.
7
For all types of NLRB supervised elections in 1977 the average number of employees
voting per establishment was 53, and three-fourths of all collective bargaining and decertification elections involved 59 or fewer employees. 42 NLRB ANN. REP. 20 (1977).
98 Some employers are ideologically opposed to unions and would under no circumstances recognize a union . . [these] employers realize that the unfair
labor practice and litigation routes are the most efficacious means ... [of
keeping the union out].
In cases involving such employers, Joy Silk bargaining orders are inadequate remedial devices. In roughly one-third of the Joy Silk cases examined in
this study, .unions were unsuccessful in obtaining contracts, primarily
because of their inability, following employer unfair labor practices, to regain
support among employees.
Wolkinson, supra note 27, at 33.
"See note 18 & accompanying text supra.

"'°It is important not to overestimate the frequency with which such elections could occur. Present Board policy bars repudiation of a union, absent the exceptional circumstances outlined in note 29, supra,during the term of an existing collective bargaining
contract. R. GORMAN. BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 9 (1976); JFreidin, The Board, the "Bar"
and the Bargain, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 61 (1959). Two-thirds of such contracts currently
negotiated have a duration of three years, and approximately one-fourth have a duration of
two years. LAB. REL Y.B.-1977 at 449.
'"Weyand, Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining,45 COLUM. L. REV. 556 (1945).
"'Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 99 (1954); see NLRB v. Century Oxford Mfg. Corp., 140
F.2d 541, 542-43 (2d Cir. 1944), cert denied, 323 U.S. 714 (1944).
"'See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 613 (1969); Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB,
321 U.S. 702, 705-06 (1944); Brooks, Stability Versus Employee Free Choice, 61 CORNELL L.
REV. 344, 366-67 (1976).
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A less radical approach would be to continue to use unfair labor practice proceedings, but to focus strictly on the issue of majority status,
rather than questions of employer doubt. 10 4 The approach formulated by
the Board in StonerRubber Co., 05
1 wherein the presumption of continuing
majority support shifts only the burden of going forward with evidence
to rebut the presumption, is preferable to the current Board test: it shifts
the focus of the dispute to the actual majority issue, 1 6 and it allocates the
burden of proving the issue to the party with the best access to the
evidence. 107 Not only is this allocation of the burden more fundamentally
fair, it conforms to the spirit of Federal Rule of Evidence 301.108
Promulgation of Board rules on which employers could rely, outlining
the objective indicia sufficient to rebut the presumption, would lead to
greater stability in bargaining relationships by decreasing the present
uncertainty as to evidentiary standards. Such rules would not only
facilitate voluntary compliance, but to the extent they afford greater
predictability of outcomes, would encourage settlement of disputes
among the parties themselves. 10 9
The least satisfactory substitute for the current test would be retention
of a modified reasonable doubt test. By lowering to "some" the amount
of evidence required to establish a reasonable doubt, and limiting the effect of production of such evidence to obtaining an election, the Board
would be able to screen groundless claims in representation hearings"'
and still leave determination of the majority issue to an election.
However, to the extent that this approach conditions the availability of
an election on the result of an employer doubt test it suffers from all the
problems of the current test.
Alternative tests of an incumbent's majority increase in desirability as
they move from the uncertainty of a state-of-mind test to objective indications of actual majority. An election is the most reliable and fastest
of such indications and therefore is the preferable route.
CONCLUSION

Because National Labor Relations Board bargaining orders are
"strong medicine""' to remedy an employer's refusal to bargain, their
10'See

Seger, supra note 7, at 978-89.

105123 N.L.R.B. 1440 (1959).
1"See notes 36-40 & accompanying text supra.
" See notes 60-63 & accompanying text supra.
"'See notes 80-82 & accompanying text supra.
"'9Cf SEC Release No. 33-5487, 39 Fed. Reg. 15,261 (1974) (Notice of Adoption of Rule
146 under the Securities Act of 1933; "[sluch a rule should reduce uncertainty to the extent
feasible and provide more objective standards upon which responsible businessmen may
rely.., in a manner that complies with the requirements of the Act."). NLRB reluctance to
promulgate such rules is near legendary, however, and it is unlikely the Board will resoit to
the rule-making process. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969); K. DAVIS.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT§ 6.08, at 152 (1972); Peck, The AtrophiedRule-Making Powers
of the NLRB, 70 YALE L.J. 729 (1961).
"'See 42 NLRB ANN. REP. 7 (1977).
1"NLRB v. Flomatic Corp., 347 F.2d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 1965).
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use in situations where a union seeks initial recognition has been limited
to cases in which the employees' power to choose a bargaining representative in an election has been precluded by an employer's unlawful activity. When an employer commits no acts which would impair an election,
an election is the favored method of determining majority status because
it ensures greater reliability, speed, administrative efficiency and less
party hostility than does an unfair labor practice proceeding.
Retention of a doubt test when an employer refuses to bargain with an
incumbent union on grounds of loss of majority has led to confused
evidentiary standards and a failure to focus on the crucial issue of actual
majority status. Furthermore, the bases for the presumption of continuing majority are exceedingly weak, and the operation of the presumption violates the spirit of Federal Rule of Evidence 301.
The current Board approach stems from a laudable desire to protect
unions from harassment by anti-union employers seeking to undermine
union support. Adoption of a test similar to that used in the initial
recognition situations, would not, however, subject unions to undue
harassment. The shift in focus from a search for employer doubt to
resolution of the issue of the union's actual majority by the most reliable
and speediest means available would also be in greater harmony with the
underlying policies of the NLRA. Less drastic cures of the present situation might alleviate some of the unfairness and confusion generated by
the current approach, but would fail to deal fully with the problems of
reliability, speed and violation of the policies of the NLRA.
Only through the establishment of fair and evenhanded procedures
whose meaning can be clearly understood by the parties can the Board
settle majority disputes promptly and reliably, and thus encourage
voluntary settlement of such disputes by the parties themselves; this is
the real industrial stability ultimately envisioned by the National Labor
Relations Act.
C. FREDERICK LEBARON, JR.

